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TRAPS FOR THE UNWARY-THE PROBLEMS IN
SEEKING INJUNCTIVE OR MONETARY RELIEF
FROM AN UNCOMPENSATED TAKING BY
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[P] rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation."'  On the not too frequent occasions
when the federal government fails to adhere to this directive,
there are two remedies available-a suit against federal officials to
enjoin them from acting to the property owner's detriment, or a
suit for damages (commonly referred to as inverse condemnation.)
The lawyer for the property owner who has found it necessary to
seek one of these remedies will soon discover that the government
has available a large battery of defenses and other stratagems with
which to thwart his success. It is the purpose of this article to
delineate these defensive devices and, hopefully, to suggest some
ways in which they might be overcome.2
II. INJUNCTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS
It is exceedingly difficult to enjoin an officer who is ostensibly
carrying out a government project, and, in view of the magnitude
of the problems which may be presented if such a suit is lost, it is
perhaps the wiser course to bypass the injunction entirely, seeking
relief in damages.
1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
2 This article will deal with the defenses raised by the government once
a suit has been brought against it. Two excellent articles discussing
the remedies available against the government are Developments in
the Law, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70
HAnv. L. REv. 827 (1957) and Note, Eminent Domain-Rights and Rem-
edies of an Uncompensated Landowner, 1962 WASH. L. Q. 210. The
latter article contains extensive citations to cases wherein the various
remedies have been sought. It is not, however, limited to remedies
against the Federal Government, but discusses state cases at length.
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A. THE UNITED STATES AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY:
Generally, in a suit which involves federal interests, the United
States is a necessary party to the action. Thus a key defense in an
action to enjoin a federal officer, where the United States is not
named as a defendant, is that the United States is an indispensable
party which has not been joined. Furthermore, the United States
cannot be joined because it cannot be sued without its consent,
and it has not consented to be sued for an injunction. Therefore,
unless there is available some relief against the named defendant
to which the United States need not be a party, the suit must fail
in its entirety.3
In suits involving claims of interference by the United States
with private water rights, it is frequently argued that the limited
consent given in the McCarran Act 4 allows the United States to bejoined as a party defendant in a suit for an injunction. However,
the McCarran Act does not apply unless the case is one "involving
a general adjudication of all the rights of various owners on a
given stream." 5 This, of course, is seldom the case in a suit by an
individual property owner.
B. THE SOVEREIGN CANNOT BE BURDENED:
While the defense that the United States is an indispensable
party is undoubtedly a key defense of the government in suits for
injunctions, the courts often do not reach or examine the question
in this form. Rather, the government concentrates its main em-
phasis on the concept of sovereign immunity and the courts' opin-
ions are similarly oriented.
The concept of sovereign immunity is not without its detractors.
However, no matter what argument is used to justify it, its basic
proposition is that the sovereign cannot be subject to any burden
originating in the courts-the courts cannot direct the sovereign.
While suits are often brought against officers in the hope that an
order directed to the officer will not be regarded as burdening the
3 E.g., Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945);
Ward v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 321 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1963).
4 66 Stat. 560 (1952), 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1964). Under this provision the
United States consents to be joined in any suit for the adjudication of
the rights to the use of the waters of a river system or other source
and in some cases to suits for the administration of those rights. For
a general discussion of the McCarran Act see Comment, Adjudication
of Water Rights Claimed by the United States-Application of Com-
mon-Law Remedies and the McCarran Amendment of 1952, 48 CALIF.
L. REV. 94 (1960).
5 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963).
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sovereign, the hope is seldom, if ever, realized. More often than not,
a suit for an injunction is lost on the grounds that while the gov-
ernment is not a named party, the suit is nevertheless one against
the government and the government has not waived its immunity.
The property owner thus finds that the government's immunity
from suit extends to its officers-the government cannot be sued
through its officers.6
This extension of immunity proceeds on the theory that when
acting pursuant to their constitutionally granted statutory author-
ity, the officers act as agents of the sovereign. Thus, their acts
are the government's7 and any suit against them is deemed a suit
against the sovereign. If the officer is acting outside his statutory
authority he is not acting for the government, but acting on his
own behalf, and the suit may be maintained against him individu-
ally.8 The same situation pertains if his authority is unconstitu-
tionally granted. As a result, in many suits which are founded on
the theory that the government does not authorize its officers to do
unlawful acts, it is argued that an officer's acts constitute an ille-
gal interference such as a trespass." It would seem, however, that
such an approach is doomed to failure so long as the officers are
authorized to engage in the activity which makes the acts com-
plained of necessary. If the officers are authorized to engage in
such activity the ensuing act cannot be deemed to be unauthorized
or illegal but results rather in a legal taking, the proper remedy
for which is a suit for damages.10 This is true even though the act
itself was not specifically authorized and normally would consti-
tute an illegal interference.
While injunctions are denied most frequently on the grounds
that the officers were acting within their statutory authority, and
that this authority was constitutionally granted, it may be unneces-
sary for the courts to consider these two arguments. In Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Corp.," after setting forth these two excep-
tions to the general rule that the sovereign's immunity is ex-
6 Two noteworthy articles dealing with officers and sovereign immunity
are Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immu-
nity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1963); Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review; Sovereign Immunity Indispensable
Parties, Mandamus, 75 Hany. L. Ray. 1479 <1962).
7 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
8 Id. at 689-90.
9 E.g., Andrews v. White, 121 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), affd per
curiam, 221 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1955).
10 A prime example of this is Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
11 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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tended to its officers acting in the course of their official duties, the
Court said in a footnote:
Of course, a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even if it
is claimed that the officer being sued has acted unconstitutionally
or beyond his statutory powers, if the relief requested cannot be
granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct com-
plained of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or
the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property.12
The principle of this footnote goes to the heart of the sovereign
immunity doctrine, allowing no burden to be cast on the sovereign.
If it is found that a burden is present, the suit fails, the court
never needing to consider whether the officer's acts are constitu-
tionally authorized.
If the rule set forth in this footnote is ever widely applied, a
suit to enjoin an officer will be virtually impossible to maintain, for
the sovereign must almost always take affirmative action to com-
ply with an injunction. Even if a simple negative injunction is
sought, the sovereign will have to act affirmatively to alter the
conduct of a project which it has begun. In addition, there fre-
quently will be some disposition of Government property.13 Al-
though the principles set forth in the Larson footnote have been
applied only a few times and in a rather equivocal manner,14 the
12 337 U.S. at 691 n. 11.
13 In this respect consider the situation in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609(1963) and Turner v. Kings River Conservation Dist., 360 F.2d 184 (9th
Cir. 1966). Both cases involved attempts by lower riparian and over-
lying landowners to compel the federal officers in charge of certain
dams to operate the dams in such a manner that the flow past the
lower riparian property would be equivalent to that prior to the con-
struction of the dams. To achieve their ends the landowners brought
suits to enjoin the officers from operating the dams in certain specified
ways which allegedly interfered with the plaintiffs' rights. If the in-junctions had been granted, not only would the government have had
to act affirmatively in its operation of the dams, but there would have
been a disposition of stored water in which the government had basis
for a claim of property rights and an expenditure of federal funds in
complying with the order.
14 Seiden v. Larson, 188 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1951), overruled West Coast
Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1954); American
Dredging Co. v. Cohrane, 190 F.2d 106, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1951); cf. Ballaine
v. Alaska Ry., 259 Fed. 183 (9th Cir. 1919).
The holding of the Seiden case which applied the Larson footnote
met with some disfavor and was partially overruled in West Coast Ex-
ploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Three out
of the eight judges sitting in the West Coast case expressly adhered to
the doctrine of the Larson footnote as applied in Seiden. The principle
of the Larson footnote was also applied in American Dredging but the
West Coast court allowed this decision to stand. The court in West
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government has recently used them as the basis for its argument
in Dugan v. Rank15 and much more directly, in Turner v. Kings
River Conservation Dist.16 In Dugan, it appears that the court's
opinion might well have turned on this proposition.' 7 However, in
Turner, the court rejected the argument. Although it recognized
that the Supreme Court in Dugan had, by applying the principles
articulated in the Larson footnote, found the decree sought would
operate against the United States and could not be granted, the
Turner court nevertheless declared that the Dugan decision turned
on the fact that the officers there involved did not come within
either of the exceptions to the general rule of sovereign immunity.
It can be argued, however, that Mr. Justice Clark used the two
well known exceptions simply to buttress the decision with addi-
tional reasons why the property owner could not prevail. In light
of this, the government most likely will continue to use the rule of
the Larson footnote, and it is not inconceivable that it may gain a
greater viability than it currently has.
Another factor in the success or failure of a suit for an injunc-
tion is the range of the officer's discretion in connection with his
authorized acts. It is held that a reasonable exercise of discretion
in carrying out his functions is necessarily within his authority to
act.18 Thus, a suit for an injunction cannot lie against an officer
for the doing of an act which involves only discretion.
Finally, congressional intent frequently is involved in the ques-
tion of whether an officer can be enjoined. As in Larson, Dugan
Coast, in overruling Seiden addressed itself only to a specific inter-
pretation of the way the Seiden court had applied the footnote to
property. The West Coast court said the footnote did not make resort
to the normal exceptions to sovereign immunity automatically unnec-
essary whenever government property was involved and that the two
exceptions were not of less force because of the footnote. It said fur-
ther that the application of the footnote suggested here is extreme.
Ballaine, although it preceded Larson by thirty years and was a suit
for tort damages, is of interest as it is illustrative of the application of
the type reasoning based on the Larson footnote to the general area of
sovereign immunity extended to officers or entities distinct from the
government itself. A suit against the railroad was held to be a suit
against the United States, in part because a judgment would interfere
with United States property.
15 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
16 360 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1966).
17 372 U.S. at 620-21.
18 See Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Seiden v. Larson, 188 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir.
1951), overruled on a different point 213 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
Atchley v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 69 F.Supp. 952 (N.D. Ala.
1947).
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and Turner,19 it is argued that Congress did not intend that its
duly authorized projects should be subject to interruption by pri-
vate suits to enjoin. It is argued that as the sovereign cannot be
burdened, the judiciary cannot interfere with the executive. This
argument was ably articulated in Larson where the court said:
[I]t is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen may be
compensated for a wrong done to him by the Government. It is
a far different matter to permit a court to exercise its compulsive
powers to restrain a government from acting or to compel it to act.
There are the strongest reasons of public policy for the rule that
such relief cannot be had against the sovereign. The Government,
as a representative of the community as a whole cannot be stopped
in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of
property or contract right. As was early recognized, "the inter-
ference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties
of the executive departments would be productive of nothing but
mischief." Decatur v. Pauling, 14 Pet. 497, 516 (1840).20
The courts have become quite fond of the phrase used in Larson,
"the Government . . . cannot be stopped in its tracks" 21 and it
seems that there is no reason why a citizen should be allowed to
stop the wheels of government when his constitutional rights can
be adequately protected by other remedies such as suits for com-
pensation.
22
While there are other defenses available to the government,
23
19 337 U.S. 682 (1949); 372 U.S. 609 (1963); 360 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1966).
20 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
21 Id.
22 See Malone v. Bowdoine, 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
23 These defenses, which are pretty much separate from the concept of
sovereign immunity can best be described as follows:
State law is generally not binding on the federal government.
Unless Congress has specifically provided that it shall be binding an
argument that an officer was outside his statutory authority because
he acted contrary to state law is fruitless. E.g., Turner v. Kings River
Conservation Dist., 360 F.2d 184, 198 (9th Cir. 1966), Arizona v. Cal-
ifornia, 373 U.S. 546, 586-88 (1963); United States v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 141 F.Supp. 168 (N.D. Cal. 1956) aifd 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
Even if Congress has provided that the United States shall be bound,
a violation necessary to an officer's conduct of an authorized project
might be within his authority.
Further, a constitutional attack on a portion of the authorization
for a project will not succeed for if a part is constitutional, the courts
will not look further for purposes which may be unconstitutional. E.g.,
Anderson v. Seeman, 252 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1959). This was a case
where the authorization for the top 25 feet of a dam was attacked.
The doctrine of "intervening public use" as developed in state
courts is a good defense against an injunction after a public project is
underway even if the property owner did not know of the project, see
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the defense of sovereign immunity carries the great weight of the
government's victories and appears in virtually every suit to en-
join a federal officer. The landowner's only hope of overcoming
this defense is to prove conclusively 4 that the officer was acting
outside his statutory authority or that his authority was unconsti-
tutionally granted. 25 It is a rare day when a property owner makes
Hillside Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681 (1935);
and is occasionally used by the federal government.
Frequently use is made of the defense that the government cannot
be estopped by the misrepresentations of its agents, for the true facts-
specifications, regulations, etc.-are a matter of public record. Federal
Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Dwyer, Responsibility
of the Federal Government for Acts of Its Officials, 11 ROcKY MT. Mim.
L. INsT. 395 (1966); See Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters:
The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. REs.
J. 67, 67-74 (1963). However, some doubt has been cast on the valid-
ity of the doctrine. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 46 (1951); see
Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) to-
gether with Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation V. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82
(1913) and Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1921).
Compare Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
In the past, a mandatory injunction (used to avoid a district court's
lack of jurisdiction to grant original writs of mandamus) would occa-
sionally fail as being too closely akin to a suit for mandamus. This
problem is eliminated by 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964). But see, FED. R. Civ.
P. 81(b); 7 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 81.07 (2d ed. 1955).
Failure to join a superior officer who is an indispensable party
has been fatal, Webster v. Fall, 260 U.S. 507 (1924), but 28 U.S.C. §
1391(e) makes his joinder easy and the government seldom raises the
issue anymore. Further, though the correctness of the holding is open
to some question, Stewart v. Penny, 238 F. Supp. 821, 826 (D. Nev.
1965) has held that mere Justice Department participation in defense
of the suit is sufficient to eliminate the problem. Likewise, FED. R.
Civ. P. 25(d) has made it impossible for a cause to fail for lack of
timely substitution of parties when a defendant officer dies or leaves
office.
24 The magnitude of the plaintiff's task in this regard cannot be over-
emphasized. His burden is affirmative and heavy indeed. Not only
must he prove either that the authority was unconstitutionally granted
or that the officer was acting outside his statutory authority, he must
place in his complaint the specific statutory limitation of authority on
which he relies. It is not sufficient that he merely allege that the
officer was outside his authority. Malone v. Bowdoine, 369 U.S. 643,
648 n. 9 (1962).
25 One intriguing argument to support a claim that an officer acted
outside his statutory authority or under authority unconstitutionally
granted is that since the taking is without compensation it is uncon-
stitutional and unauthorized. Appealing though it may be, such a
"bootstrap" argument will not prevail. In Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S.
95 (1932) the court held that an uncompensated taking in pursuit of
an authorized project was not a sufficient ground to sustain an injunc-
tion and that the plaintiff must sue for damages if he hopes to get any
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this proof and successfully maintains a suit to enjoin a government
officer from acting. Thus, very few federal projects are burdened
with the delays of injunctions-the government is seldom "stopped
in its tracks."
Admittedly, the prospect of an injunction may be tempting to a
property owner-especially where he feels a particular attachment
to the land or the business he conducts on it. However, unless
there is an absolute certainty that the necessary proof can be
made, the injunction should be scrupulously avoided for one who
seeks an injunction and loses may well be barred from any other
relief.26 Usually the property owner's rights can be adequately
upheld by a monetary award, and while not without problems of
its own, a suit for compensation after the taking offers far greater
promise of relief than does the suit for injunction.
It is thus evident that the road to an injunction is extremely
hazardous and the property owner will often lose because he has
sought the wrong remedy. In such a situation about all he can do
is hope that he is still able to seek the correct remedy, compensa-
tion under the Tucker Act.
27
III. THE INJUNCTION-TUCKER ACT PROBLEM:
Frequently, as in Dugan v. Rank,28 an unsuccessful suit for an
injunction will take a good many years. Then when the property
owner attempts to bring a suit for compensation under the Tucker
Act he will find himself barred by the six year statute of limi-
tations.
29
The fact that a property owner can refrain from seeking an
injunction seems to comprise his only hope of avoiding this problem
while remaining within the court system. It is axiomatic that it is
not permissible to sue for both an injunction and compensation in
relief. The existence of the right to sue for compensation is sufficient
to answer the claim of an unconstitutional taking. See, e.g., Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (dictum); Malone v. Bowdoine, 369 U.S. 643
(1962).
26 See text infra, part III.
27 Act of March 3, 1887, Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
28 372 U.S. 609 (1963); it should be noted that fifteen years elapsed be-
tween the time the complaint was filed and the Supreme Court dis-
missed for lack of consent to sue the United States.
29 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401 & 2501 (1964); for a brief discussion of the problem,
see Morreale, Federal--State Conflicts over Western Water Rights-A
Decade of Attempted Clarifying Legislation, 20 RuTGEms L. Ra v. 423,
503 (1966).
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the same action. While normally relief may be sought in the al-
ternative, when this is done it is essential that the defendant on
each count be the same. With the federal government involved,
the defendant must be an officer if there is to be any hope of getting
an injunction, but the proper defendant in a suit for damages or
compensation is the United States. If the jurisdictional amount 0
has forced a suit in the alternative into the Court of Claims, in-
junctive relief will be precluded by the court's lack of jurisdiction
to grant specific relief.3 1 There might be an additional problem in
that such a suit might be considered to be two separate suits, one
of which would be barred by the pendency of the other, for the
Tucker Act provides that if any suit against the United States or
its officers is pending in any other court, the Court of Claims, at
least, is without jurisdiction to hear the case.32 This provision
would also make it impossible to initiate separate suits simul-
taneously and delay the damage suit until a decision was reached
in the suit for an injunction. One ray of hope for incourt relief
from the problem in some cases is that it has been held, as in
United States. v. Dickinson,33 that the statute of limitations does
not run until the taking is complete-the damage is done for good
and all time. Applying these holdings it may be possible to argue
that the extent of the damage cannot be ascertained until it is
known whether the government will be allowed to continue on the
course it is following and that, therefore, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until a decision has been reached in the in-
junction suit.3 4 However, it appears most likely that the plaintiff
80 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964).
31 See 2 M. VOLZ, WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MAuAL § 2733 (1960).
32 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1964).
33 331 U.S. 745 (1947); see also Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct.
Cl. 1964).
34 One suggested solution to this problem is a congressional enactment
tolling or completely abolishing the statute of limitations while the
property owner seeks an injunction. See Morreale, supra, note 29. It
seems, however, that such an enactment would only encourage prop-
erty owners to waste their time with injunction suits they can have
little hope of winning. There is no indication that such suits are going
to become any easier to win and every indication that success will
become even more elusive. See 3 K. DAVIs, AD ISTRATiV= LAW
TREATisE § 27.0, at 145 (Supp. 1965).
Other than the gratification of a personal desire to retain the land,
which desire he has placed above the greater public good, the property
owner can have little reason for seeking an injunction. There is no
constitutionally based reason for encouraging injunction suits as it is
possible to adequately protect the property owner's rights through a
slight reinterpretation to bring about a sensible and equitable applica-
tion of existing law. As noted infra, recent cases have opened the
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whose unsuccessful suit for an injunction has extended beyond
the statute of limitations has little recourse but to go to Congress
for relief either in the form of a private bill or by obtaining a spe-
cial waiver of the statute of limitations.3 5
IV. DAMAGES:
The property owner who has suffered an uncompensated loss
by reason of the government's activities may bring a suit for dam-
ages against the government under either the Tucker Act3 6 or the
Federal Tort Claims Act,3 7 or against the agents and entities carry-
ing out and administering the government's activities.
A. TAKING AND THE TucKER ACT:
By far the most certain way for the uncompensated property
owner to obtain relief is to bring a suit under the Tucker Act
seeking compensation for a taking.38
1. The Statute of Limitations; Jurisdiction:
The property owner's first, and most obvious, concern in a
Tucker Act suit is to make certain that he complies with the six
door for the development of a more enlightened view by the courts in
the area of compensation. If this opening is ignored and the bar
turns its efforts toward an alteration of the statute of limitations, no
real progress will be made, for an alteration of the statute will have
no effect on the loss ratio in injunction suits. The only thing accom-
plished will be that property owners will continue to go to needless
expense litigating suits they cannot win and (because the injunction
suit has depleted the property owner's resources or will to fight) the
courts will not hear as claims for compensation the suits which by
virtue of their substantial equities would bring to bear on the courts
pressure for equitable decisions in the Tucker Act suits. So long as it
is possible to protect the property owner's rights by means short of
injunction, he should not be allowed to stop the wheels of government,
placing his own self interest above that of the public.
35 As was done by Congress in United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203 (1941).
Possibly on rare occasions special equities will persuade the court to
ignore the statute of limitations. As an example of this, see Gardner
v. Panama Railroad Co., 342 U.S. 29 (1951), which, although it involves
a tort claim, no injunction being sought, is illustrative of the unusual
equities which might lead to this result.
36 Act of March 3, 1887, Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C., especially 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491 & 1346(a) (2) (1964)).
37 Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.,
especially 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1964)).
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964); U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; on Tucker Act suits
for property damage see generally 6 J. SAcKmAx, NICHOLS' Tm LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 29 (rev. 3d ed. 1965).
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year statute of limitations."9 If he is suing in a District Court
rather than the Court of Claims, he must make certain that he has
complied with the district court's jurisdictional requirements.40
2. The defense that there has been no "taking":
Before the property owner can recover under the Tucker Act
for damage to his property rights, it is imperative that he prove
the government has "taken" his property. If there is no "taking",
the property owner may recover no compensation. The govern-
ment's defenses in seeking a holding that there has not been a com-
pensable taking can be categorized into the three rather broad
groups: (1) That there is no contract upon which to base a claim
for compensation, (2) That the conditions giving rise to compensa-
tion under the fifth amendment have not been met and (3) That
the existence of prior government interests negates the idea of a
"taking." This third group, while incorporating some of the char-
acteristics of a no taking defense, also has some of its own.
a. No Contract:
The Tucker Act provides that there is
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any act of
Congress, or any regulations of an executive department, or upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liqui-
dated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.4 1
Although it has so provided from its inception,42 the courts for a
long time looked only at that portion of the act referring to con-
tracts and held that there was no compensable taking without
some sort of an agreement on the part of the government that it
would pay for the property taken. This agreement could be found,
if at all, in the form of an implied contract,43 but it was necessary
that the contract be implied in fact, not in law.
44
While the viability of the implied contract doctrine is largely
vitiated today, it still appears occasionally, and one who attempts
to rely on it as the sole basis of a suit for compensation will find
39 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401 & 2501 (1964).
40 Particularly 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964), which provides that a claim
brought in a district court cannot exceed $10,000.
41 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964).
42 Act of March 3, 1887, Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887).
43 E.g., Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918); Hill v. United States,
149 U.S. 593 (1893).
44 Hickman v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 919 (WD. La. 1955).
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time has not eased his problems. Although the factors which were
relied on by the government to disprove an implied contract are
separated for discussion, in fact they were intertwined and created
a cohesive weapon which the government wielded with great effect.
As a contract is generally indicative of some understanding be-
tween parties, the courts have often held that in the absence of an
intent on the part of the government to "take" there could be no
implied contract.45  While this intent necessary to establish an
implied in fact contract might be inferred from the surrounding
facts and circumstances, the doing of a single isolated act is not suf-
ficient.40 On the other hand the same act done a number of times
might be indicative of an intent to continue doing the act 47 and the
intent to take necessary to an implied in fact contract established.
There is no contract implied in fact if the act of the government
is done under a claim of right, for such a claim is inconsistent with
an intent to take private property.48 Nor for much the same rea-
son is there a contract implied in fact if the appropriation of the
property was by mistake.4 9
A "taking" under an implied contract theory requires that both
the government and the official actually doing the taking have
definite authority to take.5" The government indicates its decision
to act by granting authority, and thus, absent any authority, there
is no intent to take and no implied contract. At most, there would
have been a tort. However, the act on the part of the official can
later be ratified to give it the character of a compensable taking."'
45 E.g., John Horstman Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138 (1921); Tempel
v. United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918); see Portsmouth Harbor Land &
Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 337 (1922) (Mr. Justice
Brandeis, dissenting); but see Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922). It should be noted that this view
contrasts with the more modern view, pertaining to constitutional tak-
ings, that authority to do that which necessarily interferes with private
property constitutes authority to take that property even though there
is no direct intent to take.
46 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327
(1922).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 332 (Brandeis dissenting); Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121
(1918). In the same vein, see the discussion on prior government in-
terests infra.
49 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327,
332 (1922) (Justice Brandeis dissenting).
50 Id. at 332; Vansant v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 562 (1932); United
States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
51 United States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
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If the taking remains unauthorized, the property owner might be
able to recover his property by an action in ejectment.52 Lack of
authority to take is, however, probably no longer a problem, for it
seems that authority to do that which necessarily results in inter-
ference with private property is sufficient authority to support a
claim of "taking."53 Thus the importance of specific authority as
indicative of intent and indeed the requirement for an intent to
take, are for the most part relegated to the archives of history.
Finally, there is no taking by implied contract (or otherwise) if
the plaintiff has no condemnable property right.54 If there is no
such property right, the plaintiff is not deprived of anything and no
recovery can be allowed. What constitutes a condemnable property
right is open to question. It has been held, however, that rights
such as contract rights5  are condemnable property rights, and this
would tend to indicate that those with less than full title in land
might be able to recover compensation for damage to their inter-
ests.
b. The Fifth Amendment Taking:
In the 1920's and 30's, the courts began to recognize claims
based directly on the Constitution, holding that a claim for just
compensation for property taken for a public use was founded
solely on the Constitution5 6 and therefore came under the purview
of the Tucker Act.57 With the development of this doctrine, it has
become unnecessary to prove an implied contract.5 It is of course
still necessary to prove that there has been a taking.
52 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1892); compare Malone v.
Bowdoine, 369 U.S. 643 (1962) in which ejectment was disallowed on
the grounds that compensation was an available remedy. While not
based on intent, a concept of authority is also applicable in the case of
a constitutionally based taking, (see supra note 44) and if authority is
lacking, an action for ejectment might still be possible.
53 See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S.
609, 623 (1963) (dictum).
54 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 & 511
(1945). The principle here is equally applicable in a claim founded on
the constitution and the problem should receive serious consideration
in preparing the lawsuit.
55 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1921); see
also Lynah v. United States, 292 U.S. 559 (1934).
56 E.g., Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). This principle was,
however, recognized as long ago as 1893 in the dissent to Hill v. United
States, 149 U.S. 593, 600 (1893).
57 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964).
58 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
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Some of the problems encountered in proving that there was a
taking under the implied contract doctrine recur in the area of
constitutional takings.59 However, there are also a number of other
arguments available to the government.
The government's central argument in support of the conten-
tion that there has been no fifth amendment taking is the argument
that there has been no invasion. An invasion is an essential pre-
requisite to finding a fifth amendment taking, and virtually the
entire area is permeated by this concept. This invasion must be a
physical invasion of the plaintiff's property by something tangible.
It results either from an entry of the government, its entities or its
projects onto the property or from the entry of the products or
creations of the projects, provided they are sufficiently connected
with the government's activity. While "invasion" and "taking" are
really separate concepts, there seems to be a subliminal tendency
on the part of the courts to equate them. Thus, if it is found
that there has been no "invasion," it will be held that there was
no "taking".60 The courts have not, however, been entirely uniform
in applying the invasion doctrine. In United States v. Causby,61 the
59 These are the doctrines of "no condemnable property right" and "a
single isolated act." The requirement of intent occasionally appears,
but it is limited strictly to a requirement of an intent to do an act
which results in a taking. This intent is satisfied by the mere author-
ization of a project which necessarily interferes with private property
rights; thus intent is of little importance today in proving a taking.
See United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
60 The courts' insistence on strict adherence to the doctrine of invasion
frequently leads to some rather ludicrous results. In Franklin v.
United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1939) while the decision turned
on the doctrine of consequential damages, the court found there was
no invasion. The plaintiff had owned a one-fourth interest in a 1100
acre farm well above the high water mark on the east bank of the
Mississippi River. The Army Corps of Engineers built a series of dikes
on the west bank of the river and within a year erosion had deposited
the major portion of the plaintiff's farm in the Gulf of Mexico; yet the
court held that there had been no invasion. Similar results have been
reached in aviation cases of a more recent vintage such as Avery v.
United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964). In this case, one of the
plaintiffs had a house so situated beyond the end of a jet runway as
to get the full blast of the jet exhaust during runup and takeoff. The
house was rendered virtually uninhabitable, yet it was held that there
was no invasion and no taking. However, on a few occasions, the
courts have taken a more enlightened view. In United States v.
Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), the Court found there was
an "invasion" when the Government's dam several miles upstream
from the claimant's land deprived the claimant of water, which he
otherwise would have had, by halting beneficial floods.
61 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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pioneer aviation case, the Court found that there was an invasion
and taking when aircraft flew below the floor of the navigable air-
space and thus invaded the plaintiff's property.62 In Griggs v.
County of Allegheny,6 3 the floor of the navigable airspace had been
lowered so that aircraft on takeoff and landing were no longer
below it.6 4 However, recovery was allowed on the ground that the
invasion of that airspace adjacent-albeit, super adjacent-to the
property owner's land adversely affected the use of the land and
constituted a taking. While it would seem from this that the only
real basis for recovery could be the inconvenience and discomfort
caused by the noise and disturbance of low flying aircraft,65 the
courts still refuse to allow recovery if there is no actual invasion
even though there is decline in the value of the property.66
While recent decisions such as Griggs67 have not yet eliminated
the requirement for an actual physical invasion they might well
have opened the door for its demise in the not too distant future.
Should this occur it is not at all unlikely that those defenses, such
as the failure of the government to exercise a proprietary right,
consequential damage, and indirect damage, which are closely re-
lated to invasion might also fade from the scene. The task of the
property owner seeking compensation for a taking on constitutional
grounds would then be greatly simplified.
Closely allied to the concept of invasion is the idea that the
government has not "taken" property within the meaning of the
fifth amendment until it exercises a "proprietary right" over it. In
the past, it has been held that an act by the government does not
result in a compensable taking if it merely inconveniences the
62 At common law, the landowner was considered to own from the center
of the earth unto the heavens. However, times change and in the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926), Congress declared
the national sovereignty over the country's airspace and granted to all
citizens the right of free transit through the country's navigable air-
space which it defined as that "airspace above the minimum safe alti-
tudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce . . . ." In
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946), the court held, in
effect, that by virtue of this act the landowner owned up to the floor
of the navigable airspace and flights at lower altitudes were an inva-
sion of his property.
60 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
64 'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
65 But see Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 Mirc. L. REv. 1373, 1391-96
(1965).
66 E.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (1Oth Cir. 1962), this case
did note that if the property destruction had been total there might
be recovery; Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
67 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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property owner, the government acquiring no rights in the prop-
erty.68 If the government acquires no rights, it has taken nothing
for which it is bound by the Constitution 9 to pay compensation.
The notable weakness of this argument is that while the govern-
ment may have received no specific benefit, the property owner has
suffered a very real loss, his property being taken from him in
value if nothing else. It is taken even though it has simply dis-
appeared, and so far as can be determined, the destruction of a
person's private property is now as valid a basis for a claim of
compensable taking as is its adverse use by the government.
Perhaps second only to the concept of invasion and closely re-
lated to it as a defense to a suit for compensation is the doctrine of
consequential or incidental damages. If the damage is merely a
consequence of, or incidental to, the lawful activities of the govern-
ment, there is no taking.7
0
The defense of consequential damage depends largely upon
intervening factors. If outside factors intervene between the gov-
ernment's lawful act and the damage, and the damage would not
have occurred without them, the damage is merely "consequential"
or "incidental" to the act and, without more,7 1 there is no taking
and therefore, no liability.
This defense also ignores the government's true role in the
property owner's loss. But for the government's acts, he would
still have his property. Since lawful activity by the government is
inherent in the concept of a compensable taking, it would seem that
so long as there is such activity to benefit the public and this
activity results in a diminution of an individual's property, there
has been a taking for a public use, and the property owner should
be compensated under the fifth amendment without regard to the
number of intervening factors involved.
It may not be impossible to achieve this result for the courts
have been inconsistent in their application of the doctrine and un-
able to agree on what really constitutes an "intervening factor."
Often the astute property owner can take advantage of this con-
68 E.g., Vansant v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 562 (1932).
69 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
70 E.g., Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1939); Goodman
v. United States, 113 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1940).
71 In Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) the court said
by way of dictum that if the destruction of the property is total, com-
pensation might be allowed despite the fact the damage was conse-
quential.
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fusion. In United States v. Dickinson,72 a government dam, built
in the lawful pursuit of navigational improvement, had backed up
water, which in turn caused erosion of the plaintiff's land. In spite
of the fact that some of the circuit courts and the Supreme Court
have held similar erosion to be consequential damage,7 3 the Court
here held that it was not. In Cotton Land Co. v. United States,7 4
involving what many courts would consider to be intervening fac-
tors,7 5 the court added to the confusion. It implied that merely by
doing an act which resulted in the loss of value of the plaintiff's
land, the government became bound to pay, and further found the
consequential damage defense inapplicable if the contributing fac-
tors could have been foreseen, indicating that, in such a case, the
damage naturally results from the government's acts. The court
held the damage was not consequential saying:
Tlhe Government built its public improvement. The plaintiffs
lost their land. The loss resulted naturally from the improvement.
... [T]he plaintiffs are entitled, under the constitution, to be
compensated. 76
Finally, in the rather old case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., the
Court, in an enlightened moment, indicated, although indirectly,
that there should be compensation for consequential injuries.77
It would seem from the confusion and inconsistency surround-
ing the consequential damage defense that the courts, at least to
some extent, are aware of its weaknesses. Thus, it might well be
that the property owner taking advantage of the inequities and
inconsistent precedent can overcome the defense by appealing to
the court's sense of fundamental fairness.
The concepts of remote and indirect damage as a defense are
72 331 U.S. 745 (1947); see also United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445
(1903) overruled in part, 312 U.S. 592. Lynah, however, was a contract
case.
73 Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); see also Franklin v.
United States, 101 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1939).
74 75 F. Supp. 232 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
75 The government constructed and was operating a dam. The lake
created by the dam was five miles south of the plaintiff's property;
however, as the lake filled, the river lost its velocity. As a result it
deposited large quantities of sand and silt which it had picked up when
it was released from a dam further upstream. Over the years the
deposits of silt moved upstream towards the plaintiff's property. As
the silt was deposited, the elevation of the river bed rose. As the
river bed rose, the water level rose. As the water rose, the river over-
flowed and the plaintiff's land was flooded.
76 75 F. Supp. at 235.
77 80 U.S. 166, 179-81 (1871).
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closely related to and almost an integral part of the defense of con-
sequential damage and subject to the same infirmities and con-
fusion as it is. If the injury occurs distant from the Government's
activity, there is no taking. 8 Similarly, if the damage is not a
direct and necessary result of the government's activity, the prop-
erty owner cannot recover.7 9
As evidenced by Cotton,80 the element of foreseeability runs
throughout the defenses of "consequential," "remote," and "indirect"
damages, and it is perhaps for this reason alone that they are
viable. It has often been held that if the damage could not reason-
ably have been foreseen at the time the project was undertaken,
there has been no compensable taking.8 ' This defense, it seems,
stems from a desire to stabilize government planning and to make
planning for projects a more certain endeavor. When it is remem-
bered that inverse condemnation is, in reality, a remedy for the
government's failure to institute condemnation proceedings, the
reasoning behind the defense can be more easily understood. The
landowner who has fallen victim to the foreseeability argument is
considered to be in no worse position than he would otherwise be
in for he could never have expected the government to take steps
to acquire his property by condemnation if the harm to the prop-
erty were not foreseeable. When the damage is truly unforeseeable,
it becomes simply part of the price that the property owner must
pay for living in a progressive and dynamic society. It is only
when there is activity for the public good that is calculated or
should have been calculated to damage the property owner that he
is entitled to claim his property has been taken for a public use
and that he should be compensated. If this were not so, the burden
of undertaking projects highly beneficial to society could rapidly
grow out of proportion to the benefit rendered. Then the govern-
ment, forced to bear this burden, would find it necessary to cease
or drastically cutback such undertakings and the loss to society
would be enormous.8 2
Turning away from the defenses centered about the require-
ment for an invasion, we find that there is no relief for a mere
78 E.g., Christman v. United States, 74 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1934).
79 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
80 75 F. Supp. 232 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
81 E.g., Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232 (Ct. Cl. 1948)
(the damage was foreseeable); John Horstmann Co. v. United States,
257 U.S. 138 (1921) (the damage was not foreseeable).
82 To the same effect, see Fitts, Liability of the Federal Government and
Its Agents for Injuries to Real Property Resulting from River Improve-
ments, 16 TENN. L. REV. 801, 826 (1940-1941).
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temporary invasion.8 3 The doctrine of the temporary invasion is
not to be confused with the doctrine of partial taking, although
both may result from an invasion which lasts for only a limited
period of time. While a temporary invasion is noncompensable,
not resulting in a taking, the partial taking is a "taking" for which
compensation is awarded. A partial taking can arise when there is
an invasion resulting in complete deprivation of total or partial use
of the property for a period of time and the use is then restored by
an affirmative act of the government. On the other hand, a tem-
porary invasion exists if the invasion is only infrequent and per-
haps intermittent, correcting itself-the land being returned to its
normal state with no outside assistance. The invasion in this case
will have done no more than cause the landowner some inconven-
ience, and not have impaired his customary use of the land.8 4 Even
if this situation is a direct and foreseeable result of the govern-
ment's activity, temporary invasion still may constitute a valid
defense, for there is no actual appropriation of the property to
public use,85 the property owner having suffered no real damage.
Suits in inverse condemnation are necessarily retrospective in
nature, and thus the government can use with tremendous effect
the defense that the damages claimed are merely speculative.
This defense is based on the rule that the property owner must
show his property has been "taken." There is no taking until the
damage is done. There can be no compensation for damage which
has not occurred and may never occur.86 The mere fact that the
government's activities have placed a property owner in a position
where he might in the future be damaged in some way does not
meet the requirement that there be a "taking." Nor can the specu-
lative damage defense be defeated by damage occurring after the
83 See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 662, 720 (1938); San-
guinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924) (This, however, was a
contract case).
84 Although no cases articulating it have been found, the distinction be-
tween these two concepts is important for when there is a complete
deprivation of the use of the property for a period of time and the use
is then restored by the government, there is a "taking." However,
when the invasion is only temporary in the sense indicated, it appears
that there is no taking and no compensation. Unfortunately, the
courts themselves frequently confuse the two concepts, holding that a
temporary invasion is a partial taking and that a partial taking is a
temporary invasion.
85 See Goodman v. United States, 113 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1940). While
this case supports the proposition that temporary invasion constitutes
a defense in the face of direct, foreseeable results, the court seems
somewhat confused as to the true nature of a temporary invasion.
86 See United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939).
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action has commenced. The property owner must have a valid
claim at the commencement of the suit.8 7 It would seem, however,
that where the government's acts subject the property to future
damage and thereby reduce its value the damage is no longer specu-
lative-that a taking has occurred and compensation should be paid.
Finally, the "single isolated act" defense is again involved in
fifth amendment takings as well as under implied contracts.8 A
single act which results in no continuing damage does not consti-
tute a "taking." At most it would be a tort, compensable perhaps
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.8
c. Prior Government Interests:
When prior government interests are present, the government
already has a prior right in the property involved and cannot "take"
that which the property owner does not have. The government
need not recognize private, state-created interests which are inferior
to its own. These government interests most frequently take the
form of servitudes and the most common of these is the naviga-
tional servitude. Under its power to control navigation 0 the gov-
ernment has a servitude over all the navigable waterways in the
United States, and what it does in the exercise of its right does not
result in a compensable taking of that which is subject to the servi-
tude.91 It has even been argued that the scope of this navigational
servitude is not limited to acts done to improve navigation, but
that the servitude gives the government power to do whatever it
desires with the waters of a navigable stream without being re-
quired to pay compensation.92 Of course if this reasoning were to
be followed there would be no compensation allowed for govern-
ment activities dealing with virtually any of the navigable waters
87 Court of Marion County v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 120 (1918).
88 Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965); see B Amuse-
ment Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 386 (Ct. Cl. 1960); cf. Moore
v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
89 Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765(10th Cir. 1953) noted that a single act, while not a taking, might in
or under proper circumstances give rise to a claim under the F.T.C.A.
90 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824).
91 Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177 (1910); Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Gibson v. United
States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); but see, United States v. Chicago, M., St.
P. & P. Ry., 113 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1940) rev'd, 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
92 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 756 (1950) (Mr.
Justice Douglas dissenting).
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of the United States, and probably their tributaries, no matter what
the purpose of those activities and no matter what effect they
had on property owners. So far the cases relying on an exercise
of the navigational servitude have generally been limited to ac-
tivities dealing directly with navigation, and the degree to which
the servitude will be extended is a question for the future. How-
ever, at least one case has held that the government's power over
navigable waters is "as broad as" the needs of commerce-as broad
as the commerce power itself.
93
3. Other Tucker Act Problems:
a. When the property owner reclaims:
It has been argued that where the property owner is able to
reclaim the property damaged by the government, there is no "tak-
ing." This defense has, however, been disallowed, 94 as well it
should be, for even if the property owner's loss is not as great as
if the property were unreclaimed, this mitigation of the loss has
been through his own effort and expense and his property to the
extent of these expenditures has been taken for a public use. If
the government would have been liable except for the reclamation,
it should be liable, although perhaps for a reduced amount, despite
the reclamation. The government should not be allowed to escape
liability entirely, merely because the property owner has gone to
the trouble and expense of reducing his loss. If, however, the
owner's total loss including his expense and labor is less than it
would have been absent his efforts to mitigate, the government
would undoubtedly be liable for no more than the actual loss.
b. When the property owner is both injured and benefited:
On occasion the government's activity, undertaken in the hope
of alleviating a problem causing injury to landowners, will have the
result of alleviating the one problem but creating another which
also causes damage. If in such a case the owner's benefit, his total
gain, outweighs his damage, or if there is no secondary problem
but the original danger persists to a lesser extent, the courts will
set off the gain against the loss and find that there is no compen-
sable taking.9 5
c. When recovery of interest is sought:
There is a diversity of opinion as to whether interest may be
93 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
94 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
95 E.g., United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939).
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allowed on claims brought under the Tucker Act. A number of
cases applying a series of enactments originating in the old Judicial
Code 96 have held there can be no interest on claims against the
government unless it is provided for by contract or an express act
of Congress.97 However, other cases have held that in the case of
a claim based on a Constitutional taking, interest is a part of the
"just compensation" required by the fifth amendment.98
d. When the property owner seeks to counterclaim against the
United States:
There can be no counterclaim under the Tucker Act in a suit
brought by the United States. If an owner has a Tucker Act claim
against the government, he must raise it in a separate suit. 9
e. When a claim sounds in tort:
Finally, a suit under the Tucker Act may not be brought unless
it is founded on one of the grounds specifically enumerated in the
act.100 In the past, the most frequent example of the problem thus
created has been that the court has no jurisdiction to render a
judgment against the government on an action sounding in tort.'0 '
While the Court of Claims still has no jurisdiction over actions
sounding in tort, the resulting difficulty is less since the passage of
the Federal Tort Claims Act,10 2 as there is no longer any need to at-
tempt to recover under the Tucker Act for injuries which might
not amount to a taking but which probably are a tort.1 8
B. ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICERS:
In addition to suits against the government under the Tucker
Act, a property owner may maintain a damage action against a
96 These are 36 Stat. 1087 § 177; 28 U.S.C. § 284 (Old); and 28 U.S.C. §
2516 (1964).
97 E.g., United States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 762
(1950) (Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting); Jacobs v. United States, 290
U.S. 13 (1933); Seaboard Airline Ry. v. United-States, 261 U.S. 299
(1923). But see United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203 (1941).
99 E.g., United States v. Double Bend Mfg. Co., 114 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953). But see United States v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764 (10th Cir.
1959).
100 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964).
101 E.g., Christman v. United States, 74 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1934).
102 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., espe-
cially 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964)).
108 See infra part (IV, E).
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government officer in his individual capacity. This, however, is
subject to many of the same difficulties encountered in attempting
to sue an officer for an injunction; the officer will not be held
liable unless it can be proven that he was acting not for the govern-
ment, but on his own behalf.104 Also, the officer may avail himself
of some of the defenses available to the government.
'C. ACTIONS AGAINST Gov CONTRACTORS:
An action might be maintained against a private contractor
hired by the government. However, these contractors are gener-
ally considered to be acting on behalf of the government, and they
have available the government's defenses. 0 5 It has also been held
that if the contractor's actions result in a compensable taking, the
proper remedy is a Tucker Act suit against the government for
compensation, not a suit against the contractor. 0 6
D. ACTIONS AGAINST GoVER ENT CORPORATIONS:
Suits against government corporations present a different prob-
lem, and they cannot be joined with Tucker Act suits against the
United States.0 7 A government corporation characteristically has
certain attributes of both a private corporation and the government.
The acts creating most government corporations, such as the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority,108 contain provisions authorizing them to
sue and be sued. However, this does not create equality between
private and government corporations in this regard. The latter still
retain many of the defenses available to the government and its
agencies. 00 If the United States is the real party in interest, or
the judgment would necessarily affect it, sovereign immunity will
extend to the corporation." 0 Further, since the regulations gov-
erning federal corporations are published, the corporation may take
advantage of the defense that estoppel may not be invoked against
the government."' However, at least insofar as administration is
104 See Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940); Randall v. Brig-
ham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868) (a state case).
105 Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
106 Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940); Schaefer Brewing
Co. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
107 Lynn v. United States, 110 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1940).
108 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933i Ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (1933-
1934); 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831d (1964).
109 See Atchley v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 69 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ala.
1947).
110 ,Ballaine v. Alaska N. Ry., 259 F. 183 (9th Cir. 1919).
111 Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). This is dis-
cussed supra note 23.
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concerned, the federal corporation is an entity separate from the
government and any attempt to proceed against it by injunction or
mandamus must be directed to its own officers and not to their gov-
ernmental counterparts. 112
E. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT:
The Federal Tort Claims Act" 3 gives the federal courts limited
jurisdiction over tort claims against the government, and might
afford relief in cases which once would have been dismissed as
sounding in tort. However, if the United States could not have been
liable for a taking when the interference complained of was non-
negligent, the mere existence of the Federal Tort Claims Act does
not render it liable simply because the act claimed to be a taking
was done negligently." 4
Further, unlike the Tucker Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act is
subject to a two year statute of limitations," 5 and there is no con-
current jurisdiction between the Court of Claims and the district
courts. Tort claims must be brought in the district courts" 6 or
presented to the proper administrative authorities." 7 The Court of
Claims does, however, when both parties consent, have appellatejurisdiction over district court decisions on tort claims." 8 The act
also provides numerous exceptions to the tort jurisdiction," 9 and
the courts have engaged in rather detailed interpretations limiting
its application. One result is that there is no government liability
for a deliberate nonnegligent tort, and the claim must involve
either an act of misfeasance or nonfeasance. 120 In interpreting the
discretionary act exception' 2' of the Tort Claims Act the court in
112 See United States ex rel Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U.S. 1
(1927).
113 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., espe-
cially 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964)).
"4 See Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
115 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1964).
116 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
117 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964).
118 28 U.S.C. § 1504 (1964).
119 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
120 See Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
121 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964) provides that the grant of jurisdiction
under the Federal Tort Claims Act does not extend to "any claim ...
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused."
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Dalehite v. United States,'-1 2 held that the exception applies to all
acts from the initial planning level down to the lowest level where
there is room for policy judgment and decision, and that the acts of
subordinates following directions of superiors who exercised dis-
cretion are not actionable. 123 This very effectively limits the scope
of the government's liability, but the Court further held that there
is no absolute liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.12 4 There
was a slight modification of the Dalehite holding in Indian Towing
Co. v. United States 2 5 where the court held the discretionary act
exception does not apply if there is a positive duty to use due care.
Thus, the Federal Tort Claims Act is ringed with restrictive
provisions and one hoping to bring a successful suit under it must
be wary of its limitations.
V. OTHER:
A. EJEcTzAEN:
An action for ejectment against a federal officer is akin to a
suit for an injunction and subject to much the same defense. Eject-
ment was allowed in United States v. Lee, 26 but in Malone v.
Bowdoin, 27 it was disallowed. In Malone, the Court avoided over-
ruling Lee, noting that at the time Lee was decided, there was no
way for the property owner to obtain compensation. Thus, it seems
likely that so long as compensation is available, an action for eject-
ment will not succeed. If a Tucker Act suit is lost on the grounds
that the entry was in excess of constitutional statutory authority,
then perhaps a suit for ejectment would succeed if it did not im-
122 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
123 Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950) held that legis-
lative determinations to construct projects and administrative decisions
as to how to proceed are discretionary. See generally cases collected
in Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1016, 1030-37 (1965).
124 This is also articulated in Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th
Cir. 1953).
125 350 U.S. 61 (1955). A lighthouse had failed causing a tugboat to run
aground. The court held that the coast guard having exercised its dis-
cretion in erecting a lighthouse had engendered a justifiable reliance
on the light and therefore had a positive duty to use due care to main-
tain it or give warning of its failure. Having failed to do so, it was
liable.
126 106 U.S. 196 (1882). This was an action to recover from government
officers, possession of land constituting the Lee estate and which was
within the boundaries of Arlington Cemetery.
127 369 U.S. 643 (1962). This was an action to eject a United States
Forest Service officer who was occupying, in his official capacity, land
claimed by the plaintiff.
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pose a burden on the sovereign.
B. MANDAMUS:
For many years, an original action for mandamus could be
brought only in the District of Columbia.128  However, a recent
enactment 1 29 allows original actions in the nature of mandamus to
be brought in any district court. It should be noted, however, that
the writ of mandamus itself has been abolished in the federal dis-
trict courts,13 0 and it is only actions in the nature of mandamus,
perhaps for a mandatory injunction, which may be brought.
VI. CONCLUSION:
When as a result of the activities of federal officials, private
property is harmed or threatened with harm, no provision being
made for compensation, the owner's attorney must choose between
seeking an injunction or suing for damages. If the attorney makes
the wrong choice, the property owner may well be precluded from
any relief.
An action to enjoin a federal officer is at best a risky proposi-
tion, seldom resulting in a decision favorable to the plaintiff.
Should he lose, he then may well be unable to institute a suit for
damages. While a suit for damages also has its definite problems,
the greatest of which is proving that there has been a taking, the
plaintiff is much more frequently successful in this type of suit
than in a suit for an injunction. The courts as evidenced by their
decisions are in conflict as to the proper treatment of damage suits.
The Supreme Court in a few cases' 3' seems to have subliminally
recognized that the key taking defense, invasion, is wrongly and
inequitably applied. Should this defense fall, as well it might if
subjected to increasingly frequent and well directed attacks by able
lawyers, it will probably carry with it virtually every "taking" de-
fense with the exceptions of foreseeability and prior federal rights.
The defense of prior federal rights is applicable in only a limited
number of situations where no recovery could be achieved under
any theory, and the defense of foreseeability should not in this day
128 Alley v. Craig, 97 F.Supp. 576 (S.D. Me. 1951); see Marshall v. Crotty,
185 F.2d 622, 626 (1st Cir. 1950); Knapp v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 197
U.S. 536 (1905).
129 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
130 FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b); 7 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 81.07
(2d ed. 1955).
131 E.g., Griggs v. County of Alleghany, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
COMMENTS
of scientific and engineering advance, when computers are capable
of predicting almost anything, pose much of an obstacle to the dam-
aged property owner. Compensation will be readily available. The
property owner will need prove no more than that legitimate fed-
eral activity for the public good has resulted in a loss through dam-
age to or destruction of his property. While it is true that such a
course of action aimed at making compensation more readily avail-
able will not recover the property itself for the sentimental or self
interested landowner, it will encourage the property owner to vin-
dicate his rights through suits for damages and enable the govern-
ment to carry out its projects for the greater public good without
the delay, expense and harassment which might result from follow-
ing a course tending to increase rather than, as is happening today,
diminish the success met with in suits for injunctions.
The lawyer who chooses the damages road will not only benefit
from the potential ease with which a suit for damages may be
won, and advance the effort to encourage such suits over injunc-
tions, but he will find that he has given himself far greater freedom
of advocacy than if he had sought an injunction. He is afforded an
opportunity to argue the basic justice of his client's claim rather
than being forced to fit the claim into an uncomfortable mold.
Should a damage suit be lost, the lawyer has the comfort of
knowing that his client may not be in such an irreversible position
as he would be in if a suit to enjoin had been lost. When the dam-
age suit is lost, the court may well have laid the foundation for
specific relief in the form of an injunction or ejectment by finding
that the interference was not a compensable taking because it was
without statutory authorization, or unconstitutional. Should this
occur, the lawyer's only real problem would be to prove that spe-
cific relief will not "burden the sovereign." As he would be in
equity, he would not find himself barred by the statute of limita-
tions which might confront him had he first sued for an injunction
and lost.
David R. Warner, Jr., '68
